To which is pertinent that other, “He that increases knowledge, increases grief; and in much understanding there is much indignation.”

Eodem pertinet illud quoque: ‘Qui apponit scientiam, apponit dolorem, et in multo sensu, multa indignatio.’

And does he not plainly confess as much, Chapter 7, “The heart of the wise is where sadness is, but the heart of fools follows mirth”?

An non idem palam confitetur egregius ille concionator cap. 7: ‘Cor sapientum, ubi tristitia est: et cor stultorum, ubi lætitia’.

by which you see, he thought it not enough to have learned wisdom without he had added the knowledge of me also.

Eoque non satis habuit sapientiam perdiscere, nisi nostri quoque cognitionem addidisset.

And if you will not believe me, take his own words, Chapter 1, “I gave my heart to know wisdom and knowledge, madness and folly.”

Quod si mihi parum habetur fidei, ipsius accipite verba, quæ scripsit cap. 1: ‘Dedique cor meum, ut scirem prudentiam atque doctrinam, erroresque et stultitiam.’

Where, by the way, ’tis worth your remark that he intended me somewhat extraordinary that he named me last.

Quo quidem loco illud animadvertendum, ad Stultitiæ laudem pertinere, quod eam posteriore posuit loco.

A preacher wrote it, and this you know is the order among churchmen, that he that is first in dignity comes last in place, as mindful, no doubt, whatever they do in other things, herein at least to observe the evangelical precept.

Ecclesiastes scripsit, et hunc scitis esse ordinem Ecclesiasticum, ut qui dignitate primus sit, is locum obtineat extremum vel hic certe memor Euangelici præcepti.

Besides, that folly is more excellent than wisdom the son of Sirach, whoever he was, clearly witnesses, Chapter 44, whose words, so help me, Hercules! I shall not once utter before you meet my induction with a suitable answer, according to the manner of those in Plato that dispute with Socrates.

Sed Stultitiam præstantiorem esse Sapientia, et Ecclesiasticus ille quisquis fuit, liquido testatur cap. 44. cuius mehercle verba non prius proferam, quam eisagôgên meam commoda responsione adiuveritis, ut faciunt apud Platonem hi, qui cum Socrate disputant.

What things are more proper to be laid up with care, such as are rare and precious, or such as are common and of no account?

Utra magis convenit recondere, quæ rara sunt et pretiosa, an quæ vulgaria viliaque?

Why do you give me no answer?

Quid tacetis?

Well, though you should dissemble, the Greek proverb will answer for you, “Foul water is thrown out of doors;” which, if any man shall be so ungracious as to condemn, let him know ’tis Aristotle’s, the god of our masters.

Etiam si vos dissimuletis, proverbium illud Græcorum pro vobis respondet, tên epi thurais hudrian, quod ne quis impie reiiciat, refert Aristoteles magistrorum nostrorum Deus.

Is there any of you so very a fool as to leave jewels and gold in the street? In truth, I think not; in the most secret part of your house; nor is that enough;

An quisquam vestrum tam stultus est, ut gemmas et aurum in via relinquat? non, hercle, opinor.

if there be any drawer in your iron chests more private than other, there you lay them; but dirt you throw out of doors.

In abditissimis penetralibus, nec id satis, in munitissimorum scriniorum secretissimis angulis ista reponitis, coenum in propatulo relinquitis.

And therefore, if you so carefully lay up such things as you value and throw away what’s vile and of no worth, is it not plain that wisdom, which he forbids a man to hide, is of less account than folly, which he commands him to cover?

Ergo si quod pretiosius est reconditur, quod vilius exponitur, nonne palam est, sapientiam quam vetat abscondi, viliorem esse stultitia quam recondi iubet?

Take his own words, “Better is the man that hideth his folly than he that hideth his wisdom.”

Iam ipsius testimonii verba accipite: ‘Melior est homo qui abscondit stultitiam suam, quam homo qui abscondit sapientiam suam.’

Or what is that, when he attributes an upright mind without craft or malice to a fool, when a wise man the while thinks no man like himself?

Quid quod animi quoque canordem Divinæ litteræ stulto tribuunt, cum sapiens interim neminem sui similem putet.

For so I understand that in his tenth chapter, “A fool walking by the way, being a fool himself, supposes all men to be fools like him.”

Sic enim intelligo, id quod scribit Ecclesiastes, cap. 10. ‘Sed et in via stultus ambulans, cum ipse insipiens sit, omneis, stultos existimat.’

And is it not a sign of great integrity to esteem every man as good as himself, and when there is no one that leans not too much to other way, to be so frank yet as to divide his praises with another?

An non istud eximii cuiusdam candoris est, omnes æquare tibi ipsi, cumque nemo non magnifice de se sentiat, omnibus tamen tuas communicare laudes?

Nor was this great king ashamed of the name when he says of himself that he is more foolish than any man.

Proinde nec puduit tantum regem huius cognominis, cum ait cap. 30. ‘Stultissimus sum virorum’.

Nor did Paul, that great doctor of the Gentiles, writing to the Corinthians, unwillingly acknowledge it; “I speak,” says he, “like a fool. I am more.” As if it could be any dishonor to excel in folly.

Neque Paulus ille gentium doctor, Corinthiis scribens, stulti cognomen illibenter agnoscit: ‘Ut insipiens’, inquit, ‘dico, plus ego, perinde quasi turpe sit vinci stultitia’.

But here I meet with a great noise of some that endeavor to peck out the crows’ eyes; that is, to blind the doctors of our times and smoke out their eyes with new annotations; among whom my friend Erasmus, whom for honor’s sake I often mention, deserves if not the first place yet certainly the second.

Sed interim obstrepunt mihi Græculi quidam, qui tot huius temporis Theologorum, ceu cornicum oculos student configere, dum annotationes suas, veluti fumos quosdam aliis offundunt, cuius gregis si non Alpha, certe Beta meus est Erasmus, quem ego sæpius honoris causa nomino.

O most foolish instance, they cry, and well becoming Folly herself! The apostle’s meaning was wide enough from what you dream;

O vere stultam, inquiunt, et ipsa dignam MORIA citationem. Longe diversa mens Apostoli quam tu somnias!

for he spoke it not in this sense, that he would have them believe him a greater fool than the rest, but when he had said, “They are ministers of Christ, the same am I,” and by way of boasting herein had equaled himself with to others, he added this by way of correction or checking himself, “I am more,” as meaning that he was not only equal to the rest of the apostles in the work of the Gospel, but somewhat superior.

Nec enim hoc agit his verbis, ut cæteris stultior haberetur, verum eum dixisse, ‘ministri Christi sunt; et ego’, seque veluti iactabundus in hac quoque parte æquasset cæteris, per correctionem adiecit, ‘plus ego’, sentiens, se non modo parem reliquis Apostolis in Euangelii ministerio, verum etiam aliquanto superiorem.

And therefore, while he would have this received as a truth, lest nevertheless it might not relish their ears as being spoken with too much arrogance, he foreshortened his argument with the vizard of folly, “I speak like a fool,” because he knew it was the prerogative of fools to speak what they like, and that too without offense.

Idque cum ita verum videri vellet, ne tamen ut arrogantius dictum offenderet aures, præmuniit stultitiæ prætextu. Ut minus sapiens dico, propterea quod diceret esse stultorum privilegium, ut soli, verum citra offensam, proloquantur.

Whatever he thought when he wrote this, I leave it to them to discuss;

Verum quid Paulus senserit cum hæc scriberet, ipsis disputandum relinquo.

for my own part, I follow those fat, fleshy, and vulgarly approved doctors, with whom, by Jupiter! a great part of the learned had rather err than follow them that understand the tongues, though they are never so much in the right.

Ego magnos, pingues, crassos, et vulgo probatissimos Theologos sequor, cum quibus magna pars doctorum errare, nê ton Dia, malit, quam cum istis trilinguibus bene sentire.

Not any of them make greater account of those smatterers at Greek than if they were daws. Especially when a no small professor, whose name I wittingly conceal lest those choughs should chatter at me that Greek proverb I have so often mentioned, “an ass at a harp,” discoursing magisterially and theologically on this text, “I speak as a fool, I am more,” drew a new thesis;

Neque quisquam illorum Græculos istos pluris facit quam graculos: præsertim cum quidam gloriosus Theologus, cuius ego nomen prudens supprimo, ne graculi nostri continuo Græcum in illum scomma iaciant onos luras: Magistraliter et Theologaliter hunc passum enarrans, ab hoc loco.

and, which without the height of logic he could never have done, made this new subdivision—

Ut minus sapiens dico, plus ego, novum facit caput, et quod absque summa Dialectica non poterat, novam addit sectionem, ad hunc interpretans modum: Adducam enim ipsius verba non solum in forma, verum etiam in materia.

for I’ll give you his own words, not only in form but matter also—“I speak like a fool,” that is, if you look upon me as a fool for comparing myself with those false apostles, I shall seem yet a greater fool by esteeming myself before them;

‘Ut minus sapiens dico, id est, si videor vobis insipiens, me Pseudapostolis adæquando, adhuc videbor vobis minus sapiens, me eis præferendo’.

though the same person a little after, as forgetting himself, runs off to another matter.

Quamquam idem paulo post, velut oblitus sui alio delabitur.

LXIV

LXIV

But why do I thus staggeringly defend myself with one single instance? As if it were not the common privilege of divines to stretch heaven, that is Holy Writ, like a cheverel; and when there are many things in St. Paul that thwart themselves, which yet in their proper place do well enough if there be any credit to be given to St. Jerome that was master of five tongues. Such was that of his at Athens when having casually espied the inscription of that altar, he wrested it into an argument to prove the Christian faith, and leaving out all the other words because they made against him, took notice only of the two last, viz., “To the unknown God;” and those too not without some alteration, for the whole inscription was thus: “To the Gods of Asia, Europe, and Africa; To the unknown and strange Gods.”

Sed cur anxie me unius exemplo tueor? cum hoc publicum ius sit Theologorum, coelum, hoc est, Divinam Scripturam, ceu pellem extendere: cum apud divum Paulum pugnent Divinæ Scripturæ verba, quæ suo loco non pugnant, si qua fides illi pentaglôttô Hieronymo, cum Athenis forte conspectum aræ titulum torqueret in argumentum fidei Christianæ, ac cæteris omissis, quæ causæ fuerant offectura, duo tantum extrema verba decerpserit, nempe hæc, IGNOTO DEO, atque hæc quoque nonnihil immutata, siquidem integer titulus sic habebat: DIIS ASIÆ, EUROPÆ, ET AFRICÆ, DIIS IGNOTIS, ET PEREGRINIS.

And according to his example do the sons of the prophets, who, forcing out here and there four or five expressions and if need be corrupting the sense, wrest it to their own purpose; though what goes before and follows after make nothing to the matter in hand, nay, be quite against it.

Ad huius, opinor, exemplum passim iam hoi tôn theologôn paides, hinc atque hinc revulsa, quatuor aut quinque verbula, et si quid opus est, etiam depravata ad suam accommodant utilitatem, licet ea quæ præcedunt et consequuntur, aut nihil omnino faciant ad rem, aut reclament quoque.

Which yet they do with so happy an impudence that oftentimes the civilians envy them that faculty.

Quod quidem faciunt tam felici impudentia, ut sæpenumero theologis invideant iureconsulti.

For what is it in a manner they may not hope for success in, when this great doctor (I had almost bolted out his name, but that I once again stand in fear of the Greek proverb) has made a construction on an expression of Luke, so agreeable to the mind of Christ as are fire and water to one another.

Quid enim illis iam non succedat, posteaquam magnus ille, pæne nomen effutiveram, sed rursus metuo Græcum proverbium, ex Lucæ verbis sententiam expresserit, tam consentaneam animo Christi quam igni cum aqua convenit.

For when the last point of danger was at hand, at which time retainers and dependents are wont in a more special manner to attend their protectors, to examine what strength they have, and prepare for the encounter, Christ, intending to take out of his disciples’ minds all trust and confidence in such like defense, demands of them whether they wanted anything when he sent them forth so unprovided for a journey that they had neither shoes to defend their feet from the injuries of stones and briars nor the provision of a scrip to preserve them from hunger.

Etenim cum immineret extremum periculum, quo tempore solent boni clientes maxime suis adesse patronis, et quanta valent ope summachein, Christus hoc agens, ut omnem huiusmodi præsidiorum fiduciam eximeret ex animis suorum, percontatus est eos, numquid rei defuisset usquam, cum illos emisisset, adeo non instructos viatico, ut nec calceis muniret adversus spinarum et saxorum iniuriam, nec peram adderet, adversus famem.

And when they had denied that they wanted anything, he adds, “But now, he that hath a bag, let him take it, and likewise a scrip; and he that hath none, let him sell his coat and buy a sword.”

Ubi negassent defuisse quidquam, adiecit: ‘Sed nunc, inquit, qui habet sacculum tollat, similiter et peram: et qui non habet, vendat tunicam suam, et emat gladium’.

And now when the sum of all that Christ taught pressed only meekness, suffering, and contempt of life, who does not clearly perceive what he means in this place?

Cum tota Christi doctrina, nihil aliud inculcet, quam mansuetudinem, tolerantiam, vitæ contemptum, cui non perspicuum sit, quid hoc loco sentiat?

to wit, that he might the more disarm his ministers, that neglecting not only shoes and scrip but throwing away their very coat, they might, being in a manner naked, the more readily and with less hindrance take in hand the work of the Gospel, and provide themselves of nothing but a sword, not such as thieves and murderers go up and down with, but the sword of the spirit that pierces the most inward parts, and so cuts off as it were at one blow all earthly affections, that they mind nothing but their duty to God.

nempe, ut magis etiam exarmet suos legatos, ut non tantum calceos negligant et peram, verum et tunicam insuper abiiciant, nudique et prorsus expediti, munus Euangelicum aggrediantur, nihil sibi parent, nisi gladium, non istum quo grassantur latrones, et parricidæ, sed gladium spiritus, in intimos quoque pectoris sinus penetrantem, qui semel affectus omneis sic amputat, ut nihil iam illis cordi sit, præter pietatem.

But see, I pray, whither this famous theologian wrests it. By the sword he interprets defense against persecution, and by the bag sufficient provision to carry it on. As if Christ having altered his mind, in that he sent out his disciples not so royally attended as he should have done, repented himself of his former instructions:

At videte, quæso, quorsum hæc torqueat celebris ille theologus: Gladium interpretatur defensionem adversus persecutionem, sacculum sufficientem commeatus provisionem, perinde quasi Christus commutata in diversum sententia, quod oratores suos parum basilikôs instructos emisisse videretur, superioris institutionis palinodiam canat.

or as forgetting that he had said, “Blessed are ye when ye are evil spoken of, despised, and persecuted, etc.,” and forbade them to resist evil; for that the meek in spirit, not the proud, are blessed: or, lest remembering, I say, that he had compared them to sparrows and lilies, thereby minding them what small care they should take for the things of this life, was so far now from having them go forth without a sword that he commanded them to get one, though with the sale of their coat, and had rather they should go naked than want a brawling-iron by their sides.

Aut velut oblitus quod dixerat beatos fore, cum probris, contumeliis et suppliciis affligerentur, prohibens ne quando resisterent malo, mites enim beatos esse, non feroces, oblitus quod illos ad passerum, et liliorum exemplum vocarit, nunc adeo noluerit eos absque gladio proficisci, ut eum vel tunica divendita iubeat emi, malitque nudos ire, quam non accinctos ferro.

And to this, as under the word “sword” he conceives to be comprehended whatever appertains to the repelling of injuries, so under that of “scrip” he takes in whatever is necessary to the support of life.

Ad hæc quemadmodum gladii nomine contineri putat, quidquid ad depellendam vim pertinet, ita marsupii titulo complectitur, quidquid ad vitæ pertinet necessitatem.

And so does this deep interpreter of the divine meaning bring forth the apostles to preach the doctrine of a crucified Christ, but furnished at all points with lances, slings, quarterstaffs, and bombards;

Atque ita Divinæ mentis interpres Apostolos lanceis, ballistis, fundis et bombardis instructos educit ad prædicationem crucifixi.

lading them also with bag and baggage, lest perhaps it might not be lawful for them to leave their inn unless they were empty and fasting.

Loculis item, vidulis, et sarcinis onerat, ne forte non liceat illis e diversorio discedere, nisi impransis.

Nor does he take the least notice of this, that he so willed the sword to be bought, reprehends it a little after and commands it to be sheathed; and that it was never heard that the apostles ever used or swords or bucklers against the Gentiles, though ’tis likely they had done it, if Christ had ever intended, as this doctor interprets.

Nec vel illud commovit hominem, quod ensem, quem tantopere iusserat emi, mox idem obiurgans iubeat recondi, quodque numquam fando sit auditum, Apostolos ensibus aut clypeis usos adversus vim Ethnicorum, utique usuros, si Christus hoc sensisset, quod hic interpretatur.

There is another, too, whose name out of respect I pass by, a man of no small repute, who from those tents which Habakkuk mentions, “The tents of the land of Midian shall tremble,” drew this exposition, that it was prophesied of the skin of Saint Bartholomew who was flayed alive. And why, forsooth, but because those tents were covered with skins?

Est alius, quem honoris causa non nomino, haud quaquam postremi nominis, qui e tentoriis, quorum meminit Habacuk, ‘turbabuntur pelles terræ Madian’, pellem fecerit Bartholomæi excoriati.

I was lately myself at a theological dispute, for I am often there,

Ipsa nuper interfui dissertationi Theologicæ, (nam id facio frequenter).

where when one was demanding what authority there was in Holy Writ that commands heretics to be convinced by fire rather than reclaimed by argument; a crabbed old fellow, and one whose supercilious gravity spoke him at least a doctor, answered in a great fume that Saint Paul had decreed it, who said, “Reject him that is a heretic, after once or twice admonition.”

Ibi cum quispiam exigeret, quæ tandem esset Divinarum Litterarum auctoritas, quæ iuberet Hæreticos incendio vinci, magis quam disputatione revinci: Senex quidam severus, et, vel supercilio teste, Theologus, magno stomacho respondit, hanc legem tulisse Paulum Apostolum, qui dixerit: ‘Hæreticum hominem post unam et alteram correptionem devita’.

And when he had sundry times, one after another, thundered out the same thing, and most men wondered what ailed the man, at last he explained it thus, making two words of one. “A heretic must be put to death.”

Cumque ea verba idemtidem intonaret, et plerique demirarentur quid accidisset homini, tandem explanavit, de vita tollendum hæreticum.

Some laughed, and yet there wanted not others to whom this exposition seemed plainly theological; which, when some, though those very few, opposed, they cut off the dispute, as we say, with a hatchet, and the credit of so uncontrollable an author. “Pray conceive me,” said he, “it is written, ‘Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live.’ But every heretic bewitches the people; therefore, etc.”

Risere quidam, nec deerant tamen quibus hoc commentum plane theologicum videretur, cæterum reclamantibus etiamnum nonnullis successit Tenedios, quod aiunt, sunêgopos et auctor irrefragabilis. Accipite rem, inquit: Scriptum est: ‘Maleficum ne patiaris vivere’: Omnis Hæreticus maleficus: Ergo etc.

And now, as many as were present admired the man’s wit, and consequently submitted to his decision of the question.

Mirati quotquot aderant, hominis ingenium, et in eam sententiam itum est pedibus, et quidem peronatis.

Nor came it into any of their heads that that law concerned only fortunetellers, enchanters, and magicians, whom the Hebrews call in their tongue “Mecaschephim,” witches or sorcerers: for otherwise, perhaps, by the same reason it might as well have extended to fornication and drunkenness.

Neque cuiquam venit in mentem, legem eam ad sortilegos et incantatores, ac magos at tinere, quos Hebræi sua lingua vocant mekascephim, alioqui fornicationem et ebrietatem capite punire oportuit.

LXV

LXV

But I foolishly run on in these matters, though yet there are so many of them that neither Chrysippus’ nor Didymus’ volumes are large enough to contain them.

Verum hæc stulte persequor, tam innumera, ut nec Chrysippi, nec Didymi voluminibus omnia comprehendi possint.

I would only desire you to consider this, that if so great doctors may be allowed this liberty, you may the more reasonably pardon even me also, a raw, effeminate divine, if I quote not everything so exactly as I should.

Illud dumtaxat admonitos volebam, cum hæc divinis illis magistris licuerint, mihi quoque plane sukinê theologô, par est dare veniam, si minus omnia ad amussim citavero.

And so at last I return to Paul. “Ye willingly,” says he, “suffer my foolishness,” and again, “Take me as a fool,” and further, “I speak it not after the Lord, but as it were foolishly,”

Nunc tandem ad Paulum redeo: ‘Libenter’, inquit, ‘fertis insipientes,’ de sese loquens. Et rursum ‘velut insipientem accipite me.’ Et: ‘Non loquor secundum Deum, sed quasi in insipientia’.

and in another place, “We are fools for Christ’s sake.”

Rursum alibi: ‘Nos’, inquit, ‘stulti propter Christum.’

You have heard from how great an author how great praises of folly;

Audistis a quanto auctore quanta stultitiæ præconia.

and to what other end, but that without doubt he looked upon it as that one thing both necessary and profitable. “If anyone among ye,” says he, “seem to be wise, let him be a fool that he may be wise.”

Quid, quod idem palam Stultitiam præcipit, ut rem in primis necessariam et oppido salutarem. ‘Qui videtur esse sapiens inter vos, stultus fiat, ut sit sapiens’.

And in Luke, Jesus called those two disciples with whom he joined himself upon the way, “fools.”

Et apud Lucam, duos discipulos, quibus se iunxerat in via Iesus, stultos appellat.

Nor can I give you any reason why it should seem so strange when Saint Paul imputes a kind of folly even to God himself. “The foolishness of God,” says he, “is wiser than men.”

Illud haud scio, an mirum videatur, cum Deo quoque nonnihil stultitiæ tribuit divinus ille Paulus: ‘Quod stultum est’, inquit, ‘Dei, sapientius est hominibus’.

Though yet I must confess that origin upon the place denies that this foolishness may be resembled to the uncertain judgment of men; of which kind is, that “the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness.”

Porro Origenes interpres obsistit, quo minus hanc stultitiam ad hominum opinionem possis referre: quod genus est illud: ‘Verbum crucis pereuntibus quidem stultitiam’.

But why am I so careful to no purpose that I thus run on to prove my matter by so many testimonies? when in those mystical Psalms Christ speaking to the Father says openly, “Thou knowest my foolishness.”

Sed quid ego frustra anxia, tot testimoniis hæc docere pergo, cum in psalmis mysticis palam ipse Christus loquatur Patri: ‘Tu scis insipientiam meam?’

Nor is it without ground that fools are so acceptable to God. The reason perhaps may be this, that as princes carry a suspicious eye upon those that are over-wise, and consequently hate them—as Caesar did Brutus and Cassius, when he feared not in the least drunken Antony; so Nero, Seneca; and Dionysius, Plato—and on the contrary are delighted in those blunter and unlabored wits,

Neque vero temere est, quod Deo stulti tam impense placuerunt: opinor propterea, quod quemadmodum summi principes nimium cordatos suspectos habent, et invisos, ut Iulius Brutum et Cassium, cum ebrium Antonium nihil metueret, utque Nero Senecam, Dionysius Platonem: contra crassioribus, ac simplicioribus ingeniis delectantur.

in like manner Christ ever abhors and condemns those wise men and such as put confidence in their own wisdom.

Itidem Christus sophous istos, suaque nitentes prudentia semper detestatur, ac damnat.

And this Paul makes clearly out when he said, “God hath chosen the foolish things of this world,” as well knowing it had been impossible to have reformed it by wisdom.

Testatur id Paulus haud quaquam obscure, cum ait: ‘Quæ stulta sunt mundi elegit Deus’, cumque ait, ‘Deo visum esse, ut per stultitiam servaret mundum’, quandoquidem per sapientiam restitui non poterat.

Which also he sufficiently declares himself, crying out by the mouth of his prophet, “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and cast away the understanding of the prudent.”

Quin ipse idem satis indicat, clamans per os Prophetæ: ‘Perdam sapientiam sapientium, et prudentiam prudentium reprobabo’.

And again, when Christ gives Him thanks that He had concealed the mystery of salvation from the wise, but revealed it to babes and sucklings, that is to say, fools. For the Greek word for babes is fools, which he opposes to the word wise men.

Rursum cum agit gratias, quod salutis mysterium celasset sapientes, parvulis autem, hoc est, stultis, aperuisset. Nam Græce pro parvulis, est nêpiois, quos opposuit sophois.

To this appertains that throughout the Gospel you find him ever accusing the Scribes and Pharisees and doctors of the law, but diligently defending the ignorant multitude

Huc pertinet quod passim in Euangelio, Pharisæos et scribas ac legum doctores incessit, vulgus indoctum sedulo tuetur.

(for what other is that “Woe to ye Scribes and Pharisees” than woe to you, you wise men?),

Quid enim aliud est, ‘væ vobis, scribæ et pharisæi’, quam, ‘væ vobis sapientes’?

but seems chiefly delighted in little children, women, and fishers.

At parvulis, mulieribus, ac piscatoribus potissimum delectatus esse videtur.

Besides, among brute beasts he is best pleased with those that have least in them of the foxes’ subtlety. And therefore he chose rather to ride upon an ass when, if he had pleased, he might have bestrode the lion without danger.

Quin et ex animantium brutorum genere ea potissimum placent Christo, quæ a vulpina prudentia quam longissime absunt. Eoque asino maluit insidere, cum ille, si libuisset, vel leonis tergum impune potuisset premere.

And the Holy Ghost came down in the shape of a dove, not of an eagle or kite.

Ac Spiritus ille sacer in columbæ specie delapsus est, non aquilæ aut milvii.

Add to this that in Scripture there is frequent mention of harts, hinds, and lambs;

Præterea cervorum hinnulorum, agnorum, crebra passim in Divinis Litteris mentio.

and such as are destined to eternal life are called sheep, than which creature there is not anything more foolish, if we may believe that proverb of Aristotle “sheepish manners,” which he tells us is taken from the foolishness of that creature and is used to be applied to dull-headed people and lack-wits.

Adde, quod suos ad immortalem vitam destinatos, oves appellat. Quo quidem animante non est aliud insipientius, vel Aristotelico proverbio teste, probateion êthos: quod quidem admonet, ab eius pecudis stoliditate sumptum in stupidos et bardos, convitii loco dici solere.

And yet Christ professes to be the shepherd of this flock and is himself delighted with the name of a lamb; according to Saint John, “Behold the Lamb of God!” Of which also there is much mention in the Revelation.

Atqui huius gregis Christus sese pastorem profitetur, quin etiam ipse agni nomine delectatus est, indicante eum Ioanne, Ecce agnus Dei: cuius multa fit et in Apocalypsi mentio.

And what does all this drive at, but that all mankind are fools—nay, even the very best?

Hæc quid aliud clamitant, nisi mortaleis stultos esse, etiam pios?

And Christ himself, that he might the better relieve this folly, being the wisdom of the Father, yet in some manner became a fool when taking upon him the nature of man, he was found in shape as a man;

ipsum quoque Christum, quo stultitiæ mortalium subveniret, cum esset sapientia Patris, tamen quodammodo stultum esse factum, cum hominis assumpta natura, habitu inventus est ut homo?

as in like manner he was made sin that he might heal sinners. Nor did he work this cure any other way than by the foolishness of the cross and a company of fat apostles, not much better, to whom also he carefully recommended folly but gave them a caution against wisdom and drew them together by the example of little children, lilies, mustard-seed, and sparrows, things senseless and inconsiderable, living only by the dictates of nature and without either craft or care.

quemadmodum et peccatum factus est, ut peccatis mederetur. Neque alia ratione mederi voluit quam per stultitiam crucis, per Apostolos idiotas, ac pingues: quibus sedulo stultitiam præcipit, a sapientia deterrens, cum eos ad puerorum, liliorum, sinapis, et passerculorum exemplum provocat, rerum stupidarum ac sensu carentium, soloque naturæ ductu, nulla arte, nulla sollicitudine, vitam agentium.

Besides, when he forbade them to be troubled about what they should say before governors and straightly charged them not to inquire after times and seasons, to wit, that they might not trust to their own wisdom but wholly depend on him.

Præterea cum vetat esse sollicitos, qua essent apud præsides oratione usuri, cumque interdicit, ne scrutentur tempora vel momenta temporum, videlicet, ne quid fiderent suæ prudentiæ, sed totis animis ex se penderent.

And to the same purpose is it that that great Architect of the World, God, gave man an injunction against his eating of the Tree of Knowledge, as if knowledge were the bane of happiness;

Eodem pertinet, quod Deus ille orbis architectus interminatur ne quid de arbore scientiæ degustarent, perinde quasi scientia felicitatis sit venenum.

according to which also, St. Paul disallows it as puffing up and destructive;

Quamquam Paulus aperte scientiam, veluti inflantem et perniciosam improbat.

whence also St. Bernard seems in my opinion to follow when he interprets that mountain whereon Lucifer had fixed his habitation to be the mountain of knowledge.

Quem divus Bernardus, opinor, sequutus, montem eum in quo Lucifer sedem statuerat, scientiæ montem interpretatur.

Nor perhaps ought I to omit this other argument, that Folly is so gracious above that her errors are only pardoned, those of wise men never. Whence it is that they that ask forgiveness, though they offend never so wittingly, cloak it yet with the excuse of folly.

Fortasse nec illud omittendum videatur argumentum, gratiosam esse apud superos stultitiam, quod huic solidatur erratorum venia, sapienti non ignoscitur, unde veniam orant, etiam si prudentes peccaverint, tamen stultitiæ prætextu patrocinioque utuntur.

So Aaron, in Numbers, if I mistake not the book, when he sues unto Moses concerning his sister’s leprosy, “I beseech thee, my Lord, not to lay this sin upon us, which we have foolishly committed.”

Nam sic Aaron uxoris poenam deprecatur in Numerorum, si satis commemini, libris: ‘Obsecro, domine mi, ne imponas nobis hoc peccatum, quod stulte commisimus’.

So Saul makes his excuse of David, “For behold,” says he, “I did it foolishly.”

Sic et Saul apud David culpam deprecatur: ‘Apparet enim’, inquiens, ‘quod stulte egerim’.

And again, David himself thus sweetens God, “And therefore I beseech thee, O Lord, to take away the trespass of thy servant, for I have done foolishly,” as if he knew there was no pardon to be obtained unless he had colored his offense with folly and ignorance.

Rursum ipse David ita blanditur Domino: ‘Sed precor, Domine, ut transferas iniquitatem servi tui, quia stulte egimus’: perinde quasi non impetraturus veniam, nisi stultitiam et inscitiam obtenderet.

And stronger is that of Christ upon the cross when he prayed for his enemies, “Father, forgive them,” nor does he cover their crime with any other excuse than that of unwittingness—because, says he, “they know not what they do.”

Sed illud acrius urget, quod Christus in cruce, cum oraret pro suis inimicis. ‘Pater ignosce illis’: non aliam prætexuit excusationem, quam imprudentiæ, ‘quia nesciunt’, inquit, ‘quid faciunt’.

In like manner Paul, writing to Timothy, “But therefore I obtained mercy, for that I did it ignorantly through unbelief.”

Ad eumdem modum, Paulus scribens ad Timotheum: ‘Sed ideo misericordiam Dei consecutus sum, quia ignorans feci in incredulitate’.

And what is the meaning of “I did it ignorantly” but that I did it out of folly, not malice? And what of “Therefore I received mercy” but that I had not obtained it had I not been made more allowable through the covert of folly?

Quid est, ‘ignorans feci’, nisi per stultitiam feci, non malitiam? Quid est, ‘ideo misericordiam consecutus sum’, nisi non consecuturus, ni stultitiæ patrocinio commendatus?

For us also makes that mystical Psalmist, though I remembered it not in its right place, “Remember not the sins of my youth nor my ignorances.”

Pro nobis facit et mysticus ille Psalmographus, qui suo loco non veniebat in mentem: ‘Delicta iuventutis meæ, et ignorantias meas ne memineris’.

You see what two things he pretends, to wit, youth, whose companion I ever am, and ignorances, and that in the plural number, a number of multitude, whereby we are to understand that there was no small company of them. But not to run too far in that which is infinite.

Audistis quæ duo prætexat, nimirum ætatem, cui semper comes esse soleo, et ignorantias, idque numero multitudinis, ut ingentem Stultitiæ vim intelligeremus.

LXVI

LXVI

To speak briefly, all Christian religion seems to have a kind of alliance with folly and in no respect to have any accord with wisdom.

Ac ne quæ sunt infinita persequar, utque summatim dicam, videtur omnino Christiana religio quamdam habere cum aliqua stultitia cognationem, minimeque cum sapientia convenire.

Of which if you expect proofs, consider first that boys, old men, women, and fools are more delighted with religious and sacred things than others, and to that purpose are ever next the altars; and this they do by mere impulse of nature.

Cuius rei si desideratis argumenta primum illud animadvertite, pueros, senes, mulieres, ac fatuos sacris ac religiosis rebus præter cæteros gaudere, eoque semper altaribus esse proximos, solo, nimirum, naturæ impulsu.

And in the next place, you see that those first founders of it were plain, simple persons and most bitter enemies of learning.

Præterea videtis primos illos religionis auctores, mire simplicitatem amplexos, acerrimos litterarum hostes fuisse.

Lastly there are no sort of fools seem more out of the way than are these whom the zeal of Christian religion has once swallowed up; so that they waste their estates, neglect injuries, suffer themselves to be cheated, put no difference between friends and enemies, abhor pleasure, are crammed with poverty, watchings, tears, labors, reproaches, loathe life, and wish death above all things; in short, they seem senseless to common understanding, as if their minds lived elsewhere and not in their own bodies;

Postremo nulli moriones magis desipere videntur, quam hi, quos Christianæ pietatis ardor semel totos arripuit: adeo sua profundunt, iniurias negligunt, falli sese patiuntur, inter amicos et inimicos nullum discrimen, voluptatem horrent, inedia, vigilia, lacrymis, laboribus, contumeliis saginantur, vitam fastidiunt, mortem unice optant, breviter, ad omnem sensum communem prorsus obstupuisse videntur, perinde quasi alibi vivat animus, non in suo corpore.

which, what else is it than to be mad?

Quod quidem quid aliud est, quam insanire?

For which reason you must not think it so strange if the apostles seemed to be drunk with new wine, and if Paul appeared to Festus to be mad.

quo minus mirum videri debet, si Apostoli musto temulenti sunt visi, si Paulus iudici Festo visus est insanire.

But now, having once gotten on the lion’s skin, go to, and I’ll show you that this happiness of Christians, which they pursue with so much toil, is nothing else but a kind of madness and folly; far be it that my words should give any offense, rather consider my matter.

Sed posteaquam semel tên leontên induimus, age doceamus et illud, felicitatem Christianorum, quam tot laboribus expetunt, nihil aliud esse, quam insaniæ stultitiæque genus quoddam, absit invidia verbis, rem ipsam potius expendite.

And first, the Christians and Platonists do as good as agree in this, that the soul is plunged and fettered in the prison of the body, by the grossness of which it is so tied up and hindered that it cannot take a view of or enjoy things as they truly are;

Iam primum illud propemodum Christianis convenit cum Platonicis, animum immersum illigatumque esse corporeis vinculis, huiusque crassitudine præpediri, quo minus ea, quæ vere sunt, contemplari, fruique possit.