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Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences / Discours de la mĂ©thode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la veritĂ© dans les sciences — ĐœĐ° Đ°ĐœĐłĐ»Ń–ĐčсĐșаĐč і Ń„Ń€Đ°ĐœŃ†ŃƒĐ·ŃĐșаĐč ĐŒĐŸĐČах

ĐĐœĐłĐ»Ń–ĐčсĐșа-Ń„Ń€Đ°ĐœŃ†ŃƒĐ·ŃĐșая ĐșĐœŃ–ĐłĐ°-Đ±Ń–Đ»Ń–ĐœĐłĐČа

René Descartes

Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences

René Descartes

Discours de la méthode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la verité dans les sciences

Translated by John Veitch.

If this Discourse appear too long to be read at once, it may be divided into six parts:

Si ce discours semble trop long pour ĂȘtre lu en une fois, on le pourra distinguer en six parties.

and, in the first, will be found various considerations touching the Sciences;

Et, en la premiÚre, on trouvera diverses considérations touchant les sciences.

in the second, the principal rules of the Method which the Author has discovered;

En la seconde, les principales rĂšgles de la mĂ©thode que l’auteur a cherchĂ©e.

in the third, certain of the rules of Morals which he has deduced from this Method;

En la troisiĂšme, quelques unes de celles de la morale qu’il a tirĂ©e de cette mĂ©thode.

in the fourth, the reasonings by which he establishes the existence of God and of the Human Soul, which are the foundations of his Metaphysic;

En la quatriĂšme, les raisons par lesquelles il prouve l’existence de Dieu et de l’ñme humaine, qui sont les fondements de sa mĂ©taphysique.

in the fifth, the order of the Physical questions which he has investigated, and, in particular, the explication of the motion of the heart and of some other difficulties pertaining to Medicine, as also the difference between the soul of man and that of the brutes;

En la cinquiĂšme, l’ordre des questions de physique qu’il a cherchĂ©es, et particuliĂšrement l’explication du mouvement du cƓur et de quelques autres difficultĂ©s qui appartiennent Ă  la mĂ©decine ; puis aussi la diffĂ©rence qui est entre notre Ăąme et celle des bĂȘtes.

and, in the last, what the Author believes to be required in order to greater advancement in the investigation of Nature than has yet been made, with the reasons that have induced him to write.

Et en la derniĂšre, quelles choses il croit ĂȘtre requises pour aller plus avant en la recherche de la nature qu’il n’a Ă©tĂ©, et quelles raisons l’ont fait Ă©crire.

Part I

PremiĂšre partie

Good Sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess.

Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagĂ©e ; car chacun pense en ĂȘtre si bien pourvu, que ceux mĂȘme qui sont les plus difficiles Ă  contenter en toute autre chose n’ont point coutume d’en dĂ©sirer plus qu’ils en ont.

And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing Truth from Error, which is properly what is called Good Sense or Reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of Reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same objects.

En quoi il n’est pas vraisemblable que tous se trompent : mais plutĂŽt cela tĂ©moigne que la puissance de bien juger et distinguer le vrai d’avec le faux, qui est proprement ce qu’on nomme le bon sens ou la raison, est naturellement Ă©gale en tous les hommes ; et ainsi que la diversitĂ© de nos opinions ne vient pas de ce que les uns sont plus raisonnables que les autres, mais seulement de ce que nous conduisons nos pensĂ©es par diverses voies, et ne considĂ©rons pas les mĂȘmes choses.

For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it.

Car ce n’est pas assez d’avoir l’esprit bon, mais le principal est de l’appliquer bien.

The greatest minds, as they are capable of the highest excellencies, are open likewise to the greatest aberrations; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than those who, while they run, forsake it.

Les plus grandes Ăąmes sont capables des plus grands vices aussi bien que des plus grandes vertus ; et ceux qui ne marchent que fort lentement peuvent avancer beaucoup davantage, s’ils suivent toujours le droit chemin, que ne font ceux qui courent et qui s’en Ă©loignent.

For myself, I have never fancied my mind to be in any respect more perfect than those of the generality; on the contrary, I have often wished that I were equal to some others in promptitude of thought, or in clearness and distinctness of imagination, or in fulness and readiness of memory.

Pour moi, je n’ai jamais prĂ©sumĂ© que mon esprit fĂ»t en rien plus parfait que ceux du commun ; mĂȘme j’ai souvent souhaitĂ© d’avoir la pensĂ©e aussi prompte, ou l’imagination aussi nette et distincte, ou la mĂ©moire aussi ample ou aussi prĂ©sente, que quelques autres.

And besides these, I know of no other qualities that contribute to the perfection of the mind; for as to the Reason or Sense, inasmuch as it is that alone which constitutes us men, and distinguishes us from the brutes, I am disposed to believe that it is to be found complete in each individual; and on this point to adopt the common opinion of philosophers, who say that the difference of greater and less holds only among the accidents, and not among the forms or natures of individuals of the same species.

Et je ne sache point de qualitĂ©s que celles-ci qui servent Ă  la perfection de l’esprit ; car pour la raison, ou le sens, d’autant qu’elle est la seule chose qui nous rend hommes et nous distingue des bĂȘtes, je veux croire qu’elle est tout entiĂšre en un chacun ; et suivre en ceci l’opinion commune des philosophes, qui disent qu’il n’y a du plus et du moins qu’entre les accidents, et non point entre les formes ou natures des individus d’une mĂȘme espĂšce.

I will not hesitate, however, to avow my belief that it has been my singular good fortune to have very early in life fallen in with certain tracks which have conducted me to considerations and maxims, of which I have formed a Method that gives me the means, as I think, of gradually augmenting my knowledge, and of raising it by little and little to the highest point which the mediocrity of my talents and the brief duration of my life will permit me to reach.

Mais je ne craindrai pas de dire que je pense avoir eu beaucoup d’heur de m’ĂȘtre rencontrĂ© dĂšs ma jeunesse en certains chemins qui m’ont conduit Ă  des considĂ©rations et des maximes dont j’ai formĂ© une mĂ©thode, par laquelle il me semble que j’ai moyen d’augmenter par degrĂ©s ma connoissance, et de l’élever peu Ă  peu au plus haut point auquel la mĂ©diocritĂ© de mon esprit et la courte durĂ©e de ma vie lui pourront permettre d’atteindre.

For I have already reaped from it such fruits that, although I have been accustomed to think lowly enough of myself, and although when I look with the eye of a philosopher at the varied courses and pursuits of mankind at large, I find scarcely one which does not appear vain and useless, I nevertheless derive the highest satisfaction from the progress I conceive myself to have already made in the search after truth, and cannot help entertaining such expectations of the future as to believe that if, among the occupations of men as men, there is any one really excellent and important, it is that which I have chosen.

Car j’en ai dĂ©jĂ  recueilli de tels fruits, qu’encore qu’au jugement que je fais de moi-mĂȘme je tĂąche toujours de pencher vers le cĂŽtĂ© de la dĂ©fiance plutĂŽt que vers celui de la prĂ©somption, et que, regardant d’un Ɠil de philosophe les diverses actions et entreprises de tous les hommes, il n’y en ait quasi aucune qui ne me semble vaine et inutile, je ne laisse pas de recevoir une extrĂȘme satisfaction du progrĂšs que je pense avoir dĂ©jĂ  fait en la recherche de la vĂ©ritĂ©, et de concevoir de telles espĂ©rances pour l’avenir, que si, entre les occupations des hommes, purement hommes, il y en a quelqu’une qui soit solidement bonne et importante, j’ose croire que c’est celle que j’ai choisie.

After all, it is possible I may be mistaken; and it is but a little copper and glass, perhaps, that I take for gold and diamonds.

Toutefois il se peut faire que je me trompe, et ce n’est peut-ĂȘtre qu’un peu de cuivre et de verre que je prends pour de l’or et des diamants.

I know how very liable we are to delusion in what relates to ourselves, and also how much the judgments of our friends are to be suspected when given in our favour.

Je sais combien nous sommes sujets Ă  nous mĂ©prendre en ce qui nous touche, et combien aussi les jugements de nos amis nous doivent ĂȘtre suspects, lorsqu’ils sont en notre faveur.

But I shall endeavour in this Discourse to describe the paths I have followed, and to delineate my life as in a picture, in order that each one may be able to judge of them for himself, and that in the general opinion entertained of them, as gathered from current report, I myself may have a new help towards instruction to be added to those I have been in the habit of employing.

Mais je serai bien aise de faire voir en ce discours quels sont les chemins que j’ai suivis, et d’y reprĂ©senter ma vie comme en un tableau, afin que chacun en puisse juger, et qu’apprenant du bruit commun les opinions qu’on en aura, ce soit un nouveau moyen de m’instruire, que j’ajouterai Ă  ceux dont j’ai coutume de me servir.

My present design, then, is not to teach the Method which each ought to follow for the right conduct of his Reason, but solely to describe the way in which I have endeavoured to conduct my own.

Ainsi mon dessein n’est pas d’enseigner ici la mĂ©thode que chacun doit suivre pour bien conduire sa raison, mais seulement de faire voir en quelle sorte j’ai tĂąchĂ© de conduire la mienne.

They who set themselves to give precepts must of course regard themselves as possessed of greater skill than those to whom they prescribe; and if they err in the slightest particular, they subject themselves to censure.

Ceux qui se mĂȘlent de donner des prĂ©ceptes se doivent estimer plus habiles que ceux auxquels ils les donnent ; et s’ils manquent en la moindre chose, ils en sont blĂąmables.

But as this Tract is put forth merely as a history, or, if you will, as a tale, in which, amid some examples worthy of imitation, there will be found, perhaps, as many more which it were advisable not to follow, I hope it will prove useful to some without being hurtful to any, and that my openness will find some favour with all.

Mais, ne proposant cet Ă©crit que comme une histoire, ou, si vous l’aimez mieux, que comme une fable, en laquelle, parmi quelques exemples qu’on peut imiter, on en trouvera peut-ĂȘtre aussi plusieurs autres qu’on aura raison de ne pas suivre, j’espĂšre qu’il sera utile Ă  quelques uns sans ĂȘtre nuisible Ă  personne, et que tous me sauront grĂ© de ma franchise.

From my childhood, I have been familiar with letters; and as I was given to believe that by their help a clear and certain knowledge of all that is useful in life might be acquired, I was ardently desirous of instruction.

J’ai Ă©tĂ© nourri aux lettres dĂšs mon enfance ; et, pourcequ’on me persuadoit que par leur moyen on pouvoit acquĂ©rir une connoissance claire et assurĂ©e de tout ce qui est utile Ă  la vie, j’avois un extrĂȘme dĂ©sir de les apprendre.

But as soon as I had finished the entire course of study, at the close of which it is customary to be admitted into the order of the learned, I completely changed my opinion. For I found myself involved in so many doubts and errors, that I was convinced I had advanced no farther in all my attempts at learning, than the discovery at every turn of my own ignorance.

Mais sitĂŽt que j’eus achevĂ© tout ce cours d’études, au bout duquel on a coutume d’ĂȘtre reçu au rang des doctes, je changeai entiĂšrement d’opinion. Car je me trouvois embarrassĂ© de tant de doutes et d’erreurs, qu’il me sembloit n’avoir fait autre profit, en tĂąchant de m’instruire, sinon que j’avois dĂ©couvert de plus en plus mon ignorance.

And yet I was studying in one of the most celebrated Schools in Europe, in which I thought there must be learned men, if such were anywhere to be found.

Et nĂ©anmoins j’étois en l’une des plus cĂ©lĂšbres Ă©coles de l’Europe, oĂč je pensois qu’il devoit y avoir de savants hommes, s’il y en avoit en aucun endroit de la terre.

I had been taught all that others learned there; and not contented with the sciences actually taught us, I had, in addition, read all the books that had fallen into my hands, treating of such branches as are esteemed the most curious and rare.

J’y avois appris tout ce que les autres y apprenoient ; et mĂȘme, ne m’étant pas contentĂ© des sciences qu’on nous enseignoit, j’avois parcouru tous les livres traitant de celles qu’on estime les plus curieuses et les plus rares, qui avoient pu tomber entre mes mains.

I knew the judgment which others had formed of me; and I did not find that I was considered inferior to my fellows, although there were among them some who were already marked out to fill the places of our instructors.

Avec cela je savois les jugements que les autres faisoient de moi ; et je ne voyois point qu’on m’estimĂąt infĂ©rieur Ă  mes condisciples, bien qu’il y en eĂ»t dĂ©jĂ  entre eux quelques uns qu’on destinoit Ă  remplir les places de nos maĂźtres.

And, in fine, our age appeared to me as flourishing, and as fertile in powerful minds as any preceding one.

Et enfin notre siĂšcle me sembloit aussi fleurissant et aussi fertile en bons esprits qu’ait Ă©tĂ© aucun des prĂ©cĂ©dents.

I was thus led to take the liberty of judging of all other men by myself, and of concluding that there was no science in existence that was of such a nature as I had previously been given to believe.

Ce qui me faisoit prendre la libertĂ© de juger par moi de tous les autres, et de penser qu’il n’y avoit aucune doctrine dans le monde qui fĂ»t telle qu’on m’avoit auparavant fait espĂ©rer.

I still continued, however, to hold in esteem the studies of the Schools.

Je ne laissois pas toutefois d’estimer les exercices auxquels on s’occupe dans les Ă©coles.

I was aware that the Languages taught in them are necessary to the understanding of the writings of the ancients; that the grace of Fable stirs the mind; that the memorable deeds of History elevate it; and, if read with discretion, aid in forming the judgment;

Je savois que les langues qu’on y apprend sont nĂ©cessaires pour l’intelligence des livres anciens ; que la gentillesse des fables rĂ©veille l’esprit ; que les actions mĂ©morables des histoires le relĂšvent, et qu’étant lues avec discrĂ©tion elles aident Ă  former le jugement ;

that the perusal of all excellent books is, as it were, to interview with the noblest men of past ages, who have written them, and even a studied interview, in which are discovered to us only their choicest thoughts; that Eloquence has incomparable force and beauty; that Poesy has its ravishing graces and delights;

que la lecture de tous les bons livres est comme une conversation avec les plus honnĂȘtes gens des siĂšcles passĂ©s, qui en ont Ă©tĂ© les auteurs, et mĂȘme une conversation Ă©tudiĂ©e en laquelle ils ne nous dĂ©couvrent que les meilleures de leurs pensĂ©es ; que l’éloquence a des forces et des beautĂ©s incomparables ; que la poĂ©sie a des dĂ©licatesses et des douceurs trĂšs ravissantes ;

that in the Mathematics there are many refined discoveries eminently suited to gratify the inquisitive, as well as further all the arts and lessen the labour of man; that numerous highly useful precepts and exhortations to virtue are contained in treatises on Morals; that Theology points out the path to heaven;

que les mathĂ©matiques ont des inventions trĂšs subtiles, et qui peuvent beaucoup servir tant Ă  contenter les curieux qu’à faciliter tous les arts et diminuer le travail des hommes ; que les Ă©crits qui traitent des mƓurs contiennent plusieurs enseignements et plusieurs exhortations Ă  la vertu qui sont fort utiles ; que la thĂ©ologie enseigne Ă  gagner le ciel ;

that Philosophy affords the means of discoursing with an appearance of truth on all matters, and commands the admiration of the more simple; that Jurisprudence, Medicine, and the other Sciences, secure for their cultivators honours and riches; and, in fine, that it is useful to bestow some attention upon all, even upon those abounding the most in superstition and error, that we may be in a position to determine their real value, and guard against being deceived.

que la philosophie donne moyen de parler vraisemblablement de toutes choses, et se faire admirer des moins savants ; que la jurisprudence, la mĂ©decine et les autres sciences apportent des honneurs et des richesses Ă  ceux qui les cultivent ; et enfin qu’il est bon de les avoir toutes examinĂ©es, mĂȘme les plus superstitieuses et les plus fausses, afin de connoĂźtre leur juste valeur et se garder d’en ĂȘtre trompĂ©.

But I believed that I had already given sufficient time to Languages, and likewise to the reading of the writings of the ancients, to their Histories and Fables. For to hold converse with those of other ages and to travel, are almost the same thing.

Mais je croyois avoir dĂ©jĂ  donnĂ© assez de temps aux langues, et mĂȘme aussi Ă  la lecture des livres anciens, et Ă  leurs histoires, et Ă  leurs fables. Car c’est quasi le mĂȘme de converser avec ceux des autres siĂšcles que de voyager.

It is useful to know something of the manners of different nations, that we may be enabled to form a more correct judgment regarding our own, and be prevented from thinking that everything contrary to our customs is ridiculous and irrational,—a conclusion usually come to by those whose experience has been limited to their own country.

Il est bon de savoir quelque chose des mƓurs de divers peuples, afin de juger des nîtres plus sainement, et que nous ne pensions pas que tout ce qui est contre nos modes soit ridicule et contre raison, ainsi qu’ont coutume de faire ceux qui n’ont rien vu.

On the other hand, when too much time is occupied in travelling, we become strangers to our native country; and the over curious in the customs of the past are generally ignorant of those of the present.

Mais lorsqu’on emploie trop de temps Ă  voyager, on devient enfin Ă©tranger en son pays ; et lorsqu’on est trop curieux des choses qui se pratiquoient aux siĂšcles passĂ©s, on demeure ordinairement fort ignorant de celles qui se pratiquent en celui-ci.

Besides, fictitious narratives lead us to imagine the possibility of many events that are impossible; and even the most faithful histories, if they do not wholly misrepresent matters, or exaggerate their importance to render the account of them more worthy of perusal, omit, at least, almost always the meanest and least striking of the attendant circumstances; hence it happens that the remainder does not represent the truth, and that such as regulate their conduct by examples drawn from this source, are apt to fall into the extravagances of the knight-errants of Romance, and to entertain projects that exceed their powers.

Outre que les fables font imaginer plusieurs Ă©vĂ©nements comme possibles qui ne le sont point ; et que mĂȘme les histoires les plus fidĂšles, si elles ne changent ni n’augmentent la valeur des choses pour les rendre plus dignes d’ĂȘtre lues, au moins en omettent-elles presque toujours les plus basses et moins illustres circonstances, d’oĂč vient que le reste ne paroĂźt pas tel qu’il est, et que ceux qui rĂšglent leurs mƓurs par les exemples qu’ils en tirent sont sujets Ă  tomber dans les extravagances des paladins de nos romans, et Ă  concevoir des desseins qui passent leurs forces.

I esteemed Eloquence highly, and was in raptures with Poesy; but I thought that both were gifts of nature rather than fruits of study.

J’estimois fort l’éloquence, et j’étois amoureux de la poĂ©sie ; mais je pensois que l’une et l’autre Ă©toient des dons de l’esprit plutĂŽt que des fruits de l’étude.

Those in whom the faculty of Reason is predominant, and who most skilfully dispose their thoughts with a view to render them clear and intelligible, are always the best able to persuade others of the truth of what they lay down, though they should speak only in the language of Lower Brittany, and be wholly ignorant of the rules of Rhetoric; and those whose minds are stored with the most agreeable fancies, and who can give expression to them with the greatest embellishment and harmony, are still the best poets, though unacquainted with the Art of Poetry.

Ceux qui ont le raisonnement le plus fort, et qui digĂšrent le mieux leurs pensĂ©es afin de les rendre claires et intelligibles, peuvent toujours le mieux persuader ce qu’ils proposent, encore qu’ils ne parlassent que bas-breton, et qu’ils n’eussent jamais appris de rhĂ©torique ; et ceux qui ont les inventions les plus agrĂ©ables et qui les savent exprimer avec le plus d’ornement et de douceur, ne laisseroient pas d’ĂȘtre les meilleurs poĂ«tes, encore que l’art poĂ©tique leur fĂ»t inconnu.

I was especially delighted with the Mathematics, on account of the certitude and evidence of their reasonings: but I had not as yet a precise knowledge of their true use; and thinking that they but contributed to the advancement of the mechanical arts, I was astonished that foundations, so strong and solid, should have had no loftier superstructure reared on them.

Je me plaisois surtout aux mathĂ©matiques, Ă  cause de la certitude et de l’évidence de leurs raisons : mais je ne remarquois point encore leur vrai usage ; et, pensant qu’elles ne servoient qu’aux arts mĂ©caniques, je m’étonnois de ce que leurs fondements Ă©tant si fermes et si solides, on n’avoit rien bĂąti dessus de plus relevĂ© :

On the other hand, I compared the disquisitions of the ancient Moralists to very towering and magnificent palaces with no better foundation than sand and mud:

comme au contraire je comparois les Ă©crits des anciens paĂŻens qui traitent des mƓurs, Ă  des palais fort superbes et fort magnifiques, qui n’étoient bĂątis que sur du sable et sur de la boue :

they laud the virtues very highly, and exhibit them as estimable far above anything on earth; but they give us no adequate criterion of virtue, and frequently that which they designate with so fine a name is but apathy, or pride, or despair, or parricide.

ils Ă©lĂšvent fort haut les vertus, et les font paroĂźtre estimables par-dessus toutes les choses qui sont au monde ; mais ils n’enseignent pas assez Ă  les connoĂźtre, et souvent ce qu’ils appellent d’un si beau nom n’est qu’une insensibilitĂ©, ou un orgueil, ou un dĂ©sespoir, ou un parricide.

I revered our Theology, and aspired as much as any one to reach heaven: but being given assuredly to understand that the way is not less open to the most ignorant than to the most learned, and that the revealed truths which lead to heaven are above our comprehension, I did not presume to subject them to the impotency of my Reason; and I thought that in order competently to undertake their examination, there was need of some special help from heaven, and of being more than man.

Je rĂ©vĂ©rois notre thĂ©ologie, et prĂ©tendois autant qu’aucun autre Ă  gagner le ciel : mais ayant appris, comme chose trĂšs assurĂ©e, que le chemin n’en est pas moins ouvert aux plus ignorants qu’aux plus doctes, et que les vĂ©ritĂ©s rĂ©vĂ©lĂ©es qui y conduisent sont au-dessus de notre intelligence, je n’eusse osĂ© les soumettre Ă  la foiblesse de mes raisonnements ; et je pensois que, pour entreprendre de les examiner et y rĂ©ussir, il Ă©toit besoin d’avoir quelque extraordinaire assistance du ciel, et d’ĂȘtre plus qu’homme.

Of Philosophy I will say nothing, except that when I saw that it had been cultivated for many ages by the most distinguished men, and that yet there is not a single matter within its sphere which is not still in dispute, and nothing, therefore, which is above doubt, I did not presume to anticipate that my success would be greater in it than that of others; and further, when I considered the number of conflicting opinions touching a single matter that may be upheld by learned men, while there can be but one true, I reckoned as well-nigh false all that was only probable.

Je ne dirai rien de la philosophie, sinon que, voyant qu’elle a Ă©tĂ© cultivĂ©e par les plus excellents esprits qui aient vĂ©cu depuis plusieurs siĂšcles, et que nĂ©anmoins il ne s’y trouve encore aucune chose dont on ne dispute, et par consĂ©quent qui ne soit douteuse, je n’avois point assez de prĂ©somption pour espĂ©rer d’y rencontrer mieux que les autres ; et que, considĂ©rant combien il peut y avoir de diverses opinions touchant une mĂȘme matiĂšre, qui soient soutenues par des gens doctes, sans qu’il y en puisse avoir jamais plus d’une seule qui soit vraie, je rĂ©putois presque pour faux tout ce qui n’étoit que vraisemblable.

As to the other Sciences, inasmuch as these borrow their principles from Philosophy, I judged that no solid superstructures could be reared on foundations so infirm; and neither the honour nor the gain held out by them was sufficient to determine me to their cultivation for I was not, thank Heaven, in a condition which compelled me to make merchandise of Science for the bettering of my fortune; and though I might not profess to scorn glory as a Cynic, I yet made very slight account of that honour which I hoped to acquire only through fictitious titles.

Puis, pour les autres sciences, d’autant qu’elles empruntent leurs principes de la philosophie, je jugeois qu’on ne pouvoit avoir rien bĂąti qui fĂ»t solide sur des fondements si peu fermes ; et ni l’honneur ni le gain qu’elles promettent n’étoient suffisants pour me convier Ă  les apprendre : car je ne me sentois point, grĂąces Ă  Dieu, de condition qui m’obligeĂąt Ă  faire un mĂ©tier de la science pour le soulagement de ma fortune ; et, quoique je ne fisse pas profession de mĂ©priser la gloire en cynique, je faisois nĂ©anmoins fort peu d’état de celle que je n’espĂ©rois point pouvoir acquĂ©rir qu’à faux titres.

And, in fine, of false Sciences I thought I knew the worth sufficiently to escape being deceived by the professions of an alchemist, the predictions of an astrologer, the impostures of a magician, or by the artifices and boasting of any of those who profess to know things of which they are ignorant.

Et enfin, pour les mauvaises doctrines, je pensois dĂ©jĂ  connoĂźtre assez ce qu’elles valoient pour n’ĂȘtre plus sujet Ă  ĂȘtre trompĂ© ni par les promesses d’un alchimiste, ni par les prĂ©dictions d’un astrologue, ni par les impostures d’un magicien, ni par les artifices ou la vanterie d’aucun de ceux qui font profession de savoir plus qu’ils ne savent.

For these reasons, as soon as my age permitted me to pass from under the control of my instructors, I entirely abandoned the study of letters, and resolved no longer to seek any other science than the knowledge of myself, or of the great book of the world. I spent the remainder of my youth in travelling, in visiting courts and armies, in holding intercourse with men of different dispositions and ranks, in collecting varied experience, in proving myself in the different situations into which fortune threw me, and, above all, in making such reflection on the matter of my experience as to secure my improvement.

C’est pourquoi, sitĂŽt que l’ñge me permit de sortir de la sujĂ©tion de mes prĂ©cepteurs, je quittai entiĂšrement l’étude des lettres ; et me rĂ©solvant de ne chercher plus d’autre science que celle qui se pourroit trouver en moi-mĂȘme, ou bien dans le grand livre du monde, j’employai le reste de ma jeunesse Ă  voyager, Ă  voir des cours et des armĂ©es, Ă  frĂ©quenter des gens de diverses humeurs et conditions, Ă  recueillir diverses expĂ©riences, Ă  m’éprouver moi-mĂȘme dans les rencontres que la fortune me proposoit, et partout Ă  faire telle rĂ©flexion sur les choses qui se prĂ©sentoient que j’en pusse tirer quelque profit.

For it occurred to me that I should find much more truth in the reasonings of each individual with reference to the affairs in which he is personally interested, and the issue of which must presently punish him if he has judged amiss, than in those conducted by a man of letters in his study, regarding speculative matters that are of no practical moment, and followed by no consequences to himself, farther, perhaps, than that they foster his vanity the better the more remote they are from common sense; requiring, as they must in this case, the exercise of greater ingenuity and art to render them probable.

Car il me sembloit que je pourrois rencontrer beaucoup plus de vĂ©ritĂ© dans les raisonnements que chacun fait touchant les affaires qui lui importent, et dont l’évĂ©nement le doit punir bientĂŽt aprĂšs s’il a mal jugĂ©, que dans ceux que fait un homme de lettres dans son cabinet, touchant des spĂ©culations qui ne produisent aucun effet, et qui ne lui sont d’autre consĂ©quence, sinon que peut-ĂȘtre il en tirera d’autant plus de vanitĂ© qu’elles seront plus Ă©loignĂ©es du sens commun, Ă  cause qu’il aura dĂ» employer d’autant plus d’esprit et d’artifice Ă  tĂącher de les rendre vraisemblables.

In addition, I had always a most earnest desire to know how to distinguish the true from the false, in order that I might be able clearly to discriminate the right path in life, and proceed in it with confidence.

Et j’avois toujours un extrĂȘme dĂ©sir d’apprendre Ă  distinguer le vrai d’avec le faux, pour voir clair en mes actions, et marcher avec assurance en cette vie.

It is true that, while busied only in considering the manners of other men, I found here, too, scarce any ground for settled conviction, and remarked hardly less contradiction among them than in the opinions of the philosophers.

Il est vrai que pendant que je ne faisois que considĂ©rer les mƓurs des autres hommes, je n’y trouvois guĂšre de quoi m’assurer, et que j’y remarquois quasi autant de diversitĂ© que j’avois fait auparavant entre les opinions des philosophes.

So that the greatest advantage I derived from the study consisted in this, that, observing many things which, however extravagant and ridiculous to our apprehension, are yet by common consent received and approved by other great nations, I learned to entertain too decided a belief in regard to nothing of the truth of which I had been persuaded merely by example and custom: and thus I gradually extricated myself from many errors powerful enough to darken our Natural Intelligence, and incapacitate us in great measure from listening to Reason.

En sorte que le plus grand profit que j’en retirois Ă©toit que, voyant plusieurs choses qui, bien qu’elles nous semblent fort extravagantes et ridicules, ne laissent pas d’ĂȘtre communĂ©ment reçues et approuvĂ©es par d’autres grands peuples, j’apprenois Ă  ne rien croire trop fermement de ce qui ne m’avoit Ă©tĂ© persuadĂ© que par l’exemple et par la coutume : et ainsi je me dĂ©livrois peu Ă  peu de beaucoup d’erreurs qui peuvent offusquer notre lumiĂšre naturelle, et nous rendre moins capables d’entendre raison.

But after I had been occupied several years in thus studying the book of the world, and in essaying to gather some experience, I at length resolved to make myself an object of study, and to employ all the powers of my mind in choosing the paths I ought to follow; an undertaking which was accompanied with greater success than it would have been had I never quitted my country or my books.

Mais, aprĂšs que j’eus employĂ© quelques annĂ©es Ă  Ă©tudier ainsi dans le livre du monde, et Ă  tĂącher d’acquĂ©rir quelque expĂ©rience, je pris un jour rĂ©solution d’étudier aussi en moi-mĂȘme, et d’employer toutes les forces de mon esprit Ă  choisir les chemins que je devois suivre ; ce qui me rĂ©ussit beaucoup mieux, ce me semble, que si je ne me fusse jamais Ă©loignĂ© ni de mon pays ni de mes livres.

Part II

DeuxiĂšme partie

I was then in Germany, attracted thither by the wars in that country, which have not yet been brought to a termination; and as I was returning to the army from the coronation of the Emperor, the setting in of winter arrested me in a locality where, as I found no society to interest me, and was besides fortunately undisturbed by any cares or passions, I remained the whole day in seclusion,* with full opportunity to occupy my attention with my own thoughts.

J’étois alors en Allemagne, oĂč l’occasion des guerres qui n’y sont pas encore finies m’avoit appelĂ© ; et comme je retournois du couronnement de l’empereur vers l’armĂ©e, le commencement de l’hiver m’arrĂȘta en un quartier oĂč, ne trouvant aucune conversation qui me divertĂźt, et n’ayant d’ailleurs, par bonheur, aucuns soins ni passions qui me troublassent, je demeurois tout le jour enfermĂ© seul dans un poĂȘle, oĂč j’avois tout le loisir de m’entretenir de mes pensĂ©es.

Of these one of the very first that occurred to me was, that there is seldom so much perfection in works composed of many separate parts, upon which different hands have been employed, as in those completed by a single master.

Entre lesquelles l’une des premiĂšres fut que je m’avisai de considĂ©rer que souvent il n’y a pas tant de perfection dans les ouvrages composĂ©s de plusieurs piĂšces, et faits de la main de divers maĂźtres, qu’en ceux auxquels un seul a travaillĂ©.

Thus it is observable that the buildings which a single architect has planned and executed, are generally more elegant and commodious than those which several have attempted to improve, by making old walls serve for purposes for which they were not originally built.

Ainsi voit-on que les bĂątiments qu’un seul architecte a entrepris et achevĂ©s ont coutume d’ĂȘtre plus beaux et mieux ordonnĂ©s que ceux que plusieurs ont tĂąchĂ© de raccommoder, en faisant servir de vieilles murailles qui avoient Ă©tĂ© bĂąties Ă  d’autres fins.

Thus also, those ancient cities which, from being at first only villages, have become, in course of time, large towns, are usually but ill laid out compared with the regularly constructed towns which a professional architect has freely planned on an open plain; so that although the several buildings of the former may often equal or surpass in beauty those of the latter, yet when one observes their indiscriminate juxtaposition, there a large one and here a small, and the consequent crookedness and irregularity of the streets, one is disposed to allege that chance rather than any human will guided by reason, must have led to such an arrangement.

Ainsi ces anciennes citĂ©s qui, n’ayant Ă©tĂ© au commencement que des bourgades, sont devenues par succession de temps de grandes villes, sont ordinairement si mal compassĂ©es, au prix de ces places rĂ©guliĂšres qu’un ingĂ©nieur trace Ă  sa fantaisie dans une plaine, qu’encore que, considĂ©rant leurs Ă©difices chacun Ă  part, on y trouve souvent autant ou plus d’art qu’en ceux des autres, toutefois, Ă  voir comme ils sont arrangĂ©s, ici un grand, lĂ  un petit, et comme ils rendent les rues courbĂ©es et inĂ©gales, on diroit que c’est plutĂŽt la fortune que la volontĂ© de quelques hommes usants de raison, qui les a ainsi disposĂ©s.

And if we consider that nevertheless there have been at all times certain officers whose duty it was to see that private buildings contributed to public ornament, the difficulty of reaching high perfection with but the materials of others to operate on, will be readily acknowledged.

Et si on considĂšre qu’il y a eu nĂ©anmoins de tout temps quelques officiers qui ont eu charge de prendre garde aux bĂątiments des particuliers, pour les faire servir Ă  l’ornement du public, on connoĂźtra bien qu’il est malaisĂ©, en ne travaillant que sur les ouvrages d’autrui, de faire des choses fort accomplies.

In the same way I fancied that those nations which, starting from a semi-barbarous state and advancing to civilisation by slow degrees, have had their laws successively determined, and, as it were, forced upon them simply by experience of the hurtfulness of particular crimes and disputes, would by this process come to be possessed of less perfect institutions than those which, from the commencement of their association as communities, have followed the appointments of some wise legislator.

Ainsi je m’imaginai que les peuples qui, ayant Ă©tĂ© autrefois demi-sauvages, et ne s’étant civilisĂ©s que peu Ă  peu, n’ont fait leurs lois qu’à mesure que l’incommoditĂ© des crimes et des querelles les y a contraints, ne sauroient ĂȘtre si bien policĂ©s que ceux qui, dĂšs le commencement qu’ils se sont assemblĂ©s, ont observĂ© les constitutions de quelque prudent lĂ©gislateur.

It is thus quite certain that the constitution of the true religion, the ordinances of which are derived from God, must be incomparably superior to that of every other.

Comme il est bien certain que l’état de la vraie religion, dont Dieu seul a fait les ordonnances, doit ĂȘtre incomparablement mieux rĂ©glĂ© que tous les autres.

And, to speak of human affairs, I believe that the past pre-eminence of Sparta was due not to the goodness of each of its laws in particular, for many of these were very strange, and even opposed to good morals, but to the circumstance that, originated by a single individual, they all tended to a single end.

Et, pour parler des choses humaines, je crois que si Sparte a Ă©tĂ© autrefois trĂšs florissante, ce n’a pas Ă©tĂ© Ă  cause de la bontĂ© de chacune de ses lois en particulier, vu que plusieurs Ă©toient fort Ă©tranges, et mĂȘme contraires aux bonnes mƓurs ; mais Ă  cause que, n’ayant Ă©tĂ© inventĂ©es que par un seul, elles tendoient toutes Ă  mĂȘme fin.

In the same way I thought that the sciences contained in books, (such of them at least as are made up of probable reasonings, without demonstrations,) composed as they are of the opinions of many different individuals massed together, are farther removed from truth than the simple inferences which a man of good sense using his natural and unprejudiced judgment draws respecting the matters of his experience.

Et ainsi je pensai que les sciences des livres, au moins celles dont les raisons ne sont que probables, et qui n’ont aucunes dĂ©monstrations, s’étant composĂ©es et grossies peu Ă  peu des opinions de plusieurs diverses personnes, ne sont point si approchantes de la vĂ©ritĂ© que les simples raisonnements que peut faire naturellement un homme de bon sens touchant les choses qui se prĂ©sentent.

And because we have all to pass through a state of infancy to manhood, and have been of necessity, for a length of time, governed by our desires and preceptors, (whose dictates were frequently conflicting, while neither perhaps always counselled us for the best,) I farther concluded that it is almost impossible that our judgments can be so correct or solid as they would have been, had our Reason been mature from the moment of our birth, and had we always been guided by it alone.

Et ainsi encore je pensai que pourceque nous avons tous Ă©tĂ© enfants avant que d’ĂȘtre hommes, et qu’il nous a fallu long-temps ĂȘtre gouvernĂ©s par nos appĂ©tits et nos prĂ©cepteurs, qui Ă©toient souvent contraires les uns aux autres, et qui, ni les uns ni les autres, ne nous conseilloient peut-ĂȘtre pas toujours le meilleur, il est presque impossible que nos jugements soient si purs ni si solides qu’ils auroient Ă©tĂ© si nous avions eu l’usage entier de notre raison dĂšs le point de notre naissance, et que nous n’eussions jamais Ă©tĂ© conduits que par elle.

It is true, however, that it is not customary to pull down all the houses of a town with the single design of rebuilding them differently, and thereby rendering the streets more handsome; but it often happens that a private individual takes down his own with the view of erecting it anew, and that people are even sometimes constrained to this when their houses are in danger of falling from age, or when the foundations are insecure.

Il est vrai que nous ne voyons point qu’on jette par terre toutes les maisons d’une ville pour le seul dessein de les refaire d’autre façon et d’en rendre les rues plus belles ; mais on voit bien que plusieurs font abattre les leurs, pour les rebĂątir, et que mĂȘme quelquefois ils y sont contraints, quand elles sont en danger de tomber d’elles-mĂȘmes, et que les fondements n’en sont pas bien fermes.

With this before me by way of example, I was persuaded that it would indeed be preposterous for a private individual to think of reforming a state by fundamentally changing it throughout, and overturning it in order to set it up amended; and the same I thought was true of any similar project for reforming the body of the Sciences, or the order of teaching them established in the Schools: but as for the opinions which up to that time I had embraced, I thought that I could not do better than resolve at once to sweep them wholly away, that I might afterwards be in a position to admit either others more correct, or even perhaps the same when they had undergone the scrutiny of Reason.

À l’exemple de quoi je me persuadai qu’il n’y auroit vĂ©ritablement point d’apparence qu’un particulier fĂźt dessein de rĂ©former un Ă©tat, en y changeant tout dĂšs les fondements, et en le renversant pour le redresser ; ni mĂȘme aussi de rĂ©former le corps des sciences, ou l’ordre Ă©tabli dans les Ă©coles pour les enseigner : mais que, pour toutes les opinions que j’avois reçues jusques alors en ma crĂ©ance, je ne pouvois mieux faire que d’entreprendre une bonne fois de les en ĂŽter, afin d’y en remettre par aprĂšs ou d’autres meilleures, ou bien les mĂȘmes lorsque je les aurois ajustĂ©es au niveau de la raison.

I firmly believed that in this way I should much better succeed in the conduct of my life, than if I built only upon old foundations, and leant upon principles which, in my youth, I had taken upon trust.

Et je crus fermement que par ce moyen je rĂ©ussirois Ă  conduire ma vie beaucoup mieux que si je ne bĂątissois que sur de vieux fondements, et que je ne m’appuyasse que sur les principes que je m’étois laissĂ© persuader en ma jeunesse, sans avoir jamais examinĂ© s’ils Ă©toient vrais.

For although I recognised various difficulties in this undertaking, these were not, however, without remedy, nor once to be compared with such as attend the slightest reformation in public affairs.

Car, bien que je remarquasse en ceci diverses difficultĂ©s, elles n’étoient point toutefois sans remĂšde, ni comparables Ă  celles qui se trouvent en la rĂ©formation des moindres choses qui touchent le public.

Large bodies, if once overthrown, are with great difficulty set up again, or even kept erect when once seriously shaken, and the fall of such is always disastrous.

Ces grands corps sont trop malaisĂ©s Ă  relever Ă©tant abattus, ou mĂȘme Ă  retenir Ă©tant Ă©branlĂ©s, et leurs chutes ne peuvent ĂȘtre que trĂšs rudes.

Then if there are any imperfections in the constitutions of states, (and that many such exist the diversity of constitutions is alone sufficient to assure us,) custom has without doubt materially smoothed their inconveniencies, and has even managed to steer altogether clear of, or insensibly corrected a number which sagacity could not have provided against with equal effect; and, in fine, the defects are almost always more tolerable than the change necessary for their removal; in the same manner that highways which wind among mountains, by being much frequented, become gradually so smooth and commodious, that it is much better to follow them than to seek a straighter path by climbing over the tops of rocks and descending to the bottoms of precipices.

Puis, pour leurs imperfections, s’ils en ont, comme la seule diversitĂ© qui est entre eux suffit pour assurer que plusieurs en ont, l’usage les a sans doute fort adoucies, et mĂȘme il en a Ă©vitĂ© ou corrigĂ© insensiblement quantitĂ©, auxquelles on ne pourroit si bien pourvoir par prudence ; et enfin elles sont quasi toujours plus supportables que ne seroit leur changement ; en mĂȘme façon que les grands chemins, qui tournoient entre des montagnes, deviennent peu Ă  peu si unis et si commodes, Ă  force d’ĂȘtre frĂ©quentĂ©s, qu’il est beaucoup meilleur de les suivre, que d’entreprendre d’aller plus droit, en grimpant au-dessus des rochers et descendant jusques aux bas des prĂ©cipices.

Hence it is that I cannot in any degree approve of those restless and busy meddlers who, called neither by birth nor fortune to take part in the management of public affairs, are yet always projecting reforms; and if I thought that this Tract contained aught which might justify the suspicion that I was a victim of such folly, I would by no means permit its publication.

C’est pourquoi je ne saurois aucunement approuver ces humeurs brouillonnes et inquiĂštes, qui, n’étant appelĂ©es ni par leur naissance ni par leur fortune au maniement des affaires publiques, ne laissent pas d’y faire toujours en idĂ©e quelque nouvelle rĂ©formation ; et si je pensois qu’il y eĂ»t la moindre chose en cet Ă©crit par laquelle on me pĂ»t soupçonner de cette folie, je serois trĂšs marri de souffrir qu’il fĂ»t publiĂ©.

I have never contemplated anything higher than the reformation of my own opinions, and basing them on a foundation wholly my own.

Jamais mon dessein ne s’est Ă©tendu plus avant que de tĂącher Ă  rĂ©former mes propres pensĂ©es, et de bĂątir dans un fonds qui est tout Ă  moi.

And although my own satisfaction with my work has led me to present here a draft of it, I do not by any means therefore recommend to every one else to make a similar attempt.

Que si mon ouvrage m’ayant assez plu, je vous en fais voir ici le modùle, ce n’est pas, pour cela, que je veuille conseiller à personne de l’imiter.

Those whom God has endowed with a larger measure of genius will entertain, perhaps, designs still more exalted; but for the many I am much afraid lest even the present undertaking be more than they can safely venture to imitate.

Ceux que Dieu a mieux partagĂ©s de ses grĂąces auront peut-ĂȘtre des desseins plus relevĂ©s ; mais je crains bien que celui-ci ne soit dĂ©jĂ  que trop hardi pour plusieurs.

The single design to strip one’s self of all past beliefs is one that ought not to be taken by every one.

La seule rĂ©solution de se dĂ©faire de toutes les opinions qu’on a reçues auparavant en sa crĂ©ance n’est pas un exemple que chacun doive suivre.

The majority of men is composed of two classes, for neither of which would this be at all a befitting resolution: in the first place, of those who with more than a due confidence in their own powers, are precipitate in their judgments and want the patience requisite for orderly and circumspect thinking; whence it happens, that if men of this class once take the liberty to doubt of their accustomed opinions, and quit the beaten highway, they will never be able to thread the byeway that would lead them by a shorter course, and will lose themselves and continue to wander for life;

Et le monde n’est quasi composĂ© que de deux sortes d’esprits auxquels il ne convient aucunement : Ă  savoir de ceux qui, se croyant plus habiles qu’ils ne sont, ne se peuvent empĂȘcher de prĂ©cipiter leurs jugements, ni avoir assez de patience pour conduire par ordre toutes leurs pensĂ©es, d’oĂč vient que, s’ils avoient une fois pris la libertĂ© de douter des principes qu’ils ont reçus, et de s’écarter du chemin commun, jamais ils ne pourroient tenir le sentier qu’il faut prendre pour aller plus droit, et demeureroient Ă©garĂ©s toute leur vie ;

in the second place, of those who, possessed of sufficient sense or modesty to determine that there are others who excel them in the power of discriminating between truth and error, and by whom they may be instructed, ought rather to content themselves with the opinions of such than trust for more correct to their own Reason.

puis de ceux qui, ayant assez de raison ou de modestie pour juger qu’ils sont moins capables de distinguer le vrai d’avec le faux que quelques autres par lesquels ils peuvent ĂȘtre instruits, doivent bien plutĂŽt se contenter de suivre les opinions de ces autres, qu’en chercher eux-mĂȘmes de meilleures.

For my own part, I should doubtless have belonged to the latter class, had I received instruction from but one master, or had I never known the diversities of opinion that from time immemorial have prevailed among men of the greatest learning.

Et pour moi j’aurois Ă©tĂ© sans doute du nombre de ces derniers, si je n’avois jamais eu qu’un seul maĂźtre, ou que je n’eusse point su les diffĂ©rences qui ont Ă©tĂ© de tout temps entre les opinions des plus doctes.

But I had become aware, even so early as during my college life, that no opinion, however absurd and incredible, can be imagined, which has not been maintained by some one of the philosophers; and afterwards in the course of my travels I remarked that all those whose opinions are decidedly repugnant to ours are not on that account barbarians and savages, but on the contrary that many of these nations make an equally good, if not a better, use of their Reason than we do.

Mais ayant appris dĂšs le collĂ©ge qu’on ne sauroit rien imaginer de si Ă©tranger et si peu croyable, qu’il n’ait Ă©tĂ© dit par quelqu’un des philosophes ; et depuis, en voyageant, ayant reconnu que tous ceux qui ont des sentiments fort contraires aux nĂŽtres ne sont pas pour cela barbares ni sauvages, mais que plusieurs usent autant ou plus que nous de raison ;

I took into account also the very different character which a person brought up from infancy in France or Germany exhibits, from that which, with the same mind originally, this individual would have possessed had he lived always among the Chinese or with savages, and the circumstance that in dress itself the fashion which pleased us ten years ago, and which may again, perhaps, be received into favour before ten years have gone, appears to us at this moment extravagant and ridiculous. I was thus led to infer that the ground of our opinions is far more custom and example than any certain knowledge.

et ayant considĂ©rĂ© combien un mĂȘme homme, avec son mĂȘme esprit, Ă©tant nourri dĂšs son enfance entre des Français ou des Allemands, devient diffĂ©rent de ce qu’il seroit s’il avoit toujours vĂ©cu entre des Chinois ou des cannibales, et comment, jusques aux modes de nos habits, la mĂȘme chose qui nous a plu il y a dix ans, et qui nous plaira peut-ĂȘtre encore avant dix ans, nous semble maintenant extravagante et ridicule ; en sorte que c’est bien plus la coutume et l’exemple qui nous persuade, qu’aucune connoissance certaine ;

And, finally, although such be the ground of our opinions, I remarked that a plurality of suffrages is no guarantee of truth where it is at all of difficult discovery, as in such cases it is much more likely that it will be found by one than by many. I could, however, select from the crowd no one whose opinions seemed worthy of preference, and thus I found myself constrained, as it were, to use my own Reason in the conduct of my life.

et que nĂ©anmoins la pluralitĂ© des voix n’est pas une preuve qui vaille rien, pour les vĂ©ritĂ©s un peu malaisĂ©es Ă  dĂ©couvrir, Ă  cause qu’il est bien plus vraisemblable qu’un homme seul les ait rencontrĂ©es que tout un peuple ; je ne pouvois choisir personne dont les opinions me semblassent devoir ĂȘtre prĂ©fĂ©rĂ©es Ă  celles des autres, et je me trouvai comme contraint d’entreprendre moi-mĂȘme de me conduire.

But like one walking alone and in the dark, I resolved to proceed so slowly and with such circumspection, that if I did not advance far, I would at least guard against falling.

Mais, comme un homme qui marche seul, et dans les tĂ©nĂšbres, je me rĂ©solus d’aller si lentement et d’user de tant de circonspection en toutes choses, que si je n’avançois que fort peu, je me garderois bien au moins de tomber.

I did not even choose to dismiss summarily any of the opinions that had crept into my belief without having been introduced by Reason, but first of all took sufficient time carefully to satisfy myself of the general nature of the task I was setting myself, and ascertain the true Method by which to arrive at the knowledge of whatever lay within the compass of my powers.

MĂȘme je ne voulus point commencer Ă  rejeter tout-Ă -fait aucune des opinions qui s’étoient pu glisser autrefois en ma crĂ©ance sans y avoir Ă©tĂ© introduites par la raison, que je n’eusse auparavant employĂ© assez de temps Ă  faire le projet de l’ouvrage que j’entreprenois, et Ă  chercher la vraie mĂ©thode pour parvenir Ă  la connoissance de toutes les choses dont mon esprit seroit capable.

Among the branches of Philosophy, I had, at an earlier period, given some attention to Logic, and among those of the Mathematics to Geometrical Analysis and Algebra,—three Arts or Sciences which ought, as I conceived, to contribute something to my design.

J’avois un peu Ă©tudiĂ©, Ă©tant plus jeune, entre les parties de la philosophie, Ă  la logique, et, entre les mathĂ©matiques, Ă  l’analyse des gĂ©omĂštres et Ă  l’algĂšbre, trois arts ou sciences qui sembloient devoir contribuer quelque chose Ă  mon dessein.

But, on examination, I found that, as for Logic, its syllogisms and the majority of its other precepts are of avail rather in the communication of what we already know, or even as the Art of Lully, in speaking without judgment of things of which we are ignorant, than in the investigation of the unknown; and although this Science contains indeed a number of correct and very excellent precepts, there are, nevertheless, so many others, and these either injurious or superfluous, mingled with the former, that it is almost quite as difficult to effect a severance of the true from the false as it is to extract a Diana or a Minerva from a rough block of marble.

Mais, en les examinant, je pris garde que, pour la logique, ses syllogismes et la plupart de ses autres instructions servent plutĂŽt Ă  expliquer Ă  autrui les choses qu’on sait, ou mĂȘme, comme l’art de Lulle, Ă  parler sans jugement de celles qu’on ignore, qu’à les apprendre ; et bien qu’elle contienne en effet beaucoup de prĂ©ceptes trĂšs vrais et trĂšs bons, il y en a toutefois tant d’autres mĂȘlĂ©s parmi, qui sont ou nuisibles ou superflus, qu’il est presque aussi malaisĂ© de les en sĂ©parer, que de tirer une Diane ou une Minerve hors d’un bloc de marbre qui n’est point encore Ă©bauchĂ©.

Then as to the Analysis of the ancients and the Algebra of the moderns, besides that they embrace only matters highly abstract, and, to appearance, of no use, the former is so exclusively restricted to the consideration of figures, that it can exercise the Understanding only on condition of greatly fatiguing the Imagination;* and, in the latter, there is so complete a subjection to certain rules and formulas, that there results an art full of confusion and obscurity calculated to embarrass, instead of a science fitted to cultivate the mind.

Puis, pour l’analyse des anciens et l’algĂšbre des modernes, outre qu’elles ne s’étendent qu’à des matiĂšres fort abstraites, et qui ne semblent d’aucun usage, la premiĂšre est toujours si astreinte Ă  la considĂ©ration des figures, qu’elle ne peut exercer l’entendement sans fatiguer beaucoup l’imagination ; et on s’est tellement assujetti en la derniĂšre Ă  certaines rĂšgles et Ă  certains chiffres, qu’on en a fait un art confus et obscur qui embarrasse l’esprit, au lieu d’une science qui le cultive.

By these considerations I was induced to seek some other Method which would comprise the advantages of the three and be exempt from their defects.

Ce qui fut cause que je pensai qu’il falloit chercher quelque autre mĂ©thode, qui, comprenant les avantages de ces trois, fĂ»t exempte de leurs dĂ©fauts.

And as a multitude of laws often only hampers justice, so that a state is best governed when, with few laws, these are rigidly administered; in like manner, instead of the great number of precepts of which Logic is composed, I believed that the four following would prove perfectly sufficient for me, provided I took the firm and unwavering resolution never in a single instance to fail in observing them.

Et comme la multitude des lois fournit souvent des excuses aux vices, en sorte qu’un Ă©tat est bien mieux rĂ©glĂ© lorsque, n’en ayant que fort peu, elles y sont fort Ă©troitement observĂ©es ; ainsi, au lieu de ce grand nombre de prĂ©ceptes dont la logique est composĂ©e, je crus que j’aurois assez des quatre suivants, pourvu que je prisse une ferme et constante rĂ©solution de ne manquer pas une seule fois Ă  les observer.

The first was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.

Le premier Ă©toit de ne recevoir jamais aucune chose pour vraie que je ne la connusse Ă©videmment ĂȘtre telle ; c’est-Ă -dire, d’éviter soigneusement la prĂ©cipitation et la prĂ©vention, et de ne comprendre rien de plus en mes jugements que ce qui se prĂ©senteroit si clairement et si distinctement Ă  mon esprit, que je n’eusse aucune occasion de le mettre en doute.

The second, to divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as might be necessary for its adequate solution.

Le second, de diviser chacune des difficultĂ©s que j’examinerois, en autant de parcelles qu’il se pourroit, et qu’il seroit requis pour les mieux rĂ©soudre.

The third, to conduct my thoughts in such order that, by commencing with objects the simplest and easiest to know, I might ascend by little and little, and, as it were, step by step, to the knowledge of the more complex; assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in their own nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.

Le troisiĂšme, de conduire par ordre mes pensĂ©es, en commençant par les objets les plus simples et les plus aisĂ©s Ă  connoĂźtre, pour monter peu Ă  peu comme par degrĂ©s jusques Ă  la connoissance des plus composĂ©s, et supposant mĂȘme de l’ordre entre ceux qui ne se prĂ©cĂšdent point naturellement les uns les autres.

And the last, in every case to make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured that nothing was omitted.

Et le dernier, de faire partout des dénombrements si entiers et des revues si générales, que je fusse assuré de ne rien omettre.

The long chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are accustomed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations, had led me to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is competent, are mutually connected in the same way, and that there is nothing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduction of one truth from another.

Ces longues chaĂźnes de raisons, toutes simples et faciles, dont les gĂ©omĂštres ont coutume de se servir pour parvenir Ă  leurs plus difficiles dĂ©monstrations, m’avoient donnĂ© occasion de m’imaginer que toutes les choses qui peuvent tomber sous la connoissance des hommes s’entresuivent en mĂȘme façon, et que, pourvu seulement qu’on s’abstienne d’en recevoir aucune pour vraie qui ne le soit, et qu’on garde toujours l’ordre qu’il faut pour les dĂ©duire les unes des autres, il n’y en peut avoir de si Ă©loignĂ©es auxquelles enfin on ne parvienne, ni de si cachĂ©es qu’on ne dĂ©couvre.

And I had little difficulty in determining the objects with which it was necessary to commence, for I was already persuaded that it must be with the simplest and easiest to know, and, considering that of all those who have hitherto sought truth in the Sciences, the mathematicians alone have been able to find any demonstrations, that is, any certain and evident reasons, I did not doubt but that such must have been the rule of their investigations. I resolved to commence, therefore, with the examination of the simplest objects, not anticipating, however, from this any other advantage than that to be found in accustoming my mind to the love and nourishment of truth, and to a distaste for all such reasonings as were unsound.

Et je ne fus pas beaucoup en peine de chercher par lesquelles il Ă©toit besoin de commencer : car je savois dĂ©jĂ  que c’étoit par les plus simples et les plus aisĂ©es Ă  connoĂźtre ; et, considĂ©rant qu’entre tous ceux qui ont ci-devant recherchĂ© la vĂ©ritĂ© dans les sciences, il n’y a eu que les seuls mathĂ©maticiens qui ont pu trouver quelques dĂ©monstrations, c’est-Ă -dire quelques raisons certaines et Ă©videntes, je ne doutois point que ce ne fĂ»t par les mĂȘmes qu’ils ont examinĂ©es ; bien que je n’en espĂ©rasse aucune autre utilitĂ©, sinon qu’elles accoutumeroient mon esprit Ă  se repaĂźtre de vĂ©ritĂ©s, et ne se contenter point de fausses raisons.

But I had no intention on that account of attempting to master all the particular Sciences commonly denominated Mathematics: but observing that, however different their objects, they all agree in considering only the various relations or proportions subsisting among those objects, I thought it best for my purpose to consider these proportions in the most general form possible, without referring them to any objects in particular, except such as would most facilitate the knowledge of them, and without by any means restricting them to these, that afterwards I might thus be the better able to apply them to every other class of objects to which they are legitimately applicable.

Mais je n’eus pas dessein pour cela de tĂącher d’apprendre toutes ces sciences particuliĂšres qu’on nomme communĂ©ment mathĂ©matiques ; et voyant qu’encore que leurs objets soient diffĂ©rents, elles ne laissent pas de s’accorder toutes, en ce qu’elles n’y considĂšrent autre chose que les divers rapports ou proportions qui s’y trouvent, je pensai qu’il valoit mieux que j’examinasse seulement ces proportions en gĂ©nĂ©ral, et sans les supposer que dans les sujets qui serviroient Ă  m’en rendre la connoissance plus aisĂ©e, mĂȘme aussi sans les y astreindre aucunement, afin de les pouvoir d’autant mieux appliquer aprĂšs Ă  tous les autres auxquels elles conviendroient.

Perceiving further, that in order to understand these relations I should sometimes have to consider them one by one, and sometimes only to bear them in mind, or embrace them in the aggregate, I thought that, in order the better to consider them individually, I should view them as subsisting between straight lines, than which I could find no objects more simple, or capable of being more distinctly represented to my imagination and senses;

Puis, ayant pris garde que pour les connoĂźtre j’aurois quelquefois besoin de les considĂ©rer chacune en particulier, et quelquefois seulement de les retenir, ou de les comprendre plusieurs ensemble, je pensai que, pour les considĂ©rer mieux en particulier, je les devois supposer en des lignes, Ă  cause que je ne trouvois rien de plus simple, ni que je pusse plus distinctement reprĂ©senter Ă  mon imagination et Ă  mes sens ;

and on the other hand, that in order to retain them in the memory, or embrace an aggregate of many, I should express them by certain characters the briefest possible. In this way I believed that I could borrow all that was best both in Geometrical Analysis and in Algebra, and correct all the defects of the one by help of the other.

mais que, pour les retenir, ou les comprendre plusieurs ensemble, il falloit que je les expliquasse par quelques chiffres les plus courts qu’il seroit possible ; et que, par ce moyen, j’emprunterois tout le meilleur de l’analyse gĂ©omĂ©trique et de l’algĂšbre, et corrigerois tous les dĂ©fauts de l’une par l’autre.

And, in point of fact, the accurate observance of these few precepts gave me, I take the liberty of saying, such ease in unravelling all the questions embraced in these two sciences, that in the two or three months I devoted to their examination, not only did I reach solutions of questions I had formerly deemed exceedingly difficult, but even as regards questions of the solution of which I continued ignorant, I was enabled, as it appeared to me, to determine the means whereby, and the extent to which, a solution was possible; results attributable to the circumstance that I commenced with the simplest and most general truths, and that thus each truth discovered was a rule available in the discovery of subsequent ones.

Comme en effet j’ose dire que l’exacte observation de ce peu de prĂ©ceptes que j’avois choisis me donna telle facilitĂ© Ă  dĂ©mĂȘler toutes les questions auxquelles ces deux sciences s’étendent, qu’en deux ou trois mois que j’employai Ă  les examiner, ayant commencĂ© par les plus simples et plus gĂ©nĂ©rales, et chaque vĂ©ritĂ© que je trouvois Ă©tant une rĂšgle qui me servoit aprĂšs Ă  en trouver d’autres, non seulement je vins Ă  bout de plusieurs que j’avois jugĂ©es autrefois trĂšs difficiles, mais il me sembla aussi vers la fin que je pouvois dĂ©terminer, en celles mĂȘme que j’ignorois, par quels moyens et jusqu’oĂč il Ă©toit possible de les rĂ©soudre.

Nor in this perhaps shall I appear too vain, if it be considered that, as the truth on any particular point is one, whoever apprehends the truth, knows all that on that point can be known. The child, for example, who has been instructed in the elements of Arithmetic, and has made a particular addition, according to rule, may be assured that he has found, with respect to the sum of the numbers before him, all that in this instance is within the reach of human genius. Now, in conclusion, the Method which teaches adherence to the true order, and an exact enumeration of all the conditions of the thing sought includes all that gives certitude to the rules of Arithmetic.

En quoi je ne vous paroĂźtrai peut-ĂȘtre pas ĂȘtre fort vain, si vous considĂ©rez que, n’y ayant qu’une vĂ©ritĂ© de chaque chose, quiconque la trouve en sait autant qu’on en peut savoir ; et que, par exemple, un enfant instruit en l’arithmĂ©tique, ayant fait une addition suivant ses rĂšgles, se peut assurer d’avoir trouvĂ©, touchant la somme qu’il examinoit, tout ce que l’esprit humain sauroit trouver : car enfin la mĂ©thode qui enseigne Ă  suivre le vrai ordre, et Ă  dĂ©nombrer exactement toutes les circonstances de ce qu’on cherche, contient tout ce qui donne de la certitude aux rĂšgles d’arithmĂ©tique.

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